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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of the variation in Czech managers’ pay
levels. Among the questions we attempt to answer are: Are the managers in state-owned firms
compensated differently than those in private owned firms? How much of the difference in pay
is explained by differences in individual characteristics and job levels? What is the importance
of the regional location or the industry affiliation of the firms for managerial pay differentials?
We use data from a cross-section of Czech managers in 1998 and estimate earnings equations
augmented with a host of explanatory variables related to firm and job characteristics.
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1  In fact, we are only aware of one previous study; Jones and Kato’s (1996) study of CEO compensation in
Bulgaria. There are also very few studies of the determinants of individual earnings in general; see Svejnar’s
(1999) survey. The bulk of this literature focuses on the returns to human capital and changes therein. The studies
related to firm performance have typically made use of data on average wages at the firm level.  
1. Introduction
In recent years most transition economies have been going through a privatisation process which
established a completely new firm and ownership structure. As a consequence, many of the early
top managers had to leave their positions and new managerial positions have been created in the
new born firms. The new economic environment also implied a radical change in the role of
managerial employees. During central planning their main function had predominantly been
operational; to find out the best ways of fulfilling the instructions which had been given by the
political leaders. 
Earnings of top management have jumped to higher levels than before. Of course, in countries
where egalitarian remuneration was practised for the last forty years, these developments have
attracted a lot of interest. Thus, questions whether the top managers really are worth their
compensation and whether the income differentials between different types of firms, industries
and regions can be justified,  have been raised. 
There is, however, very little systematic evidence about the managerial labour market in transition
economics. And yet, as emphasized by e.g. Aghion et al. (1994) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997),
the incentive systems of managers are crucial for transition reforms to be successful. Management
should be rewarded for reforming firms in a more market-oriented direction. This is particularly
important in the transition economies since in these countries managers have considerable power.
In fact, they appear to have more power than management in many advanced market economies.
Managerial compensation has also been in the focus in the mature capitalist economies. The bulk
of the literature has been concerned with the pay of Northern American CEO’s and with UK
directors’ pay, whereas there are rather few investigations from countries with other form of
corporate governance systems, such as those found in continental Europe. For obvious reasons,
there is much less studies from transition economies.1 Another characteristic of the literature is
that it focuses predominantly on the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance, and
hence, examines changes in CEO pay while paying little attention to differences in levels of pay
between CEO’s and especially between the CEO’s and other managerial employees in the firms;
for two recent surveys, see Murphy (1999) and Gomes-Meija and Wiseman (1998).
The aim of this paper is to examine the determinants of the variation in Czech managers’ pay
levels. Among the questions we attempt to answer are: Are the managers in state-owned firms
compensated differ1ently than those in private owned firms? How much of the difference in pay
is explained by differences in individual characteristics and job levels? What is the importance3
2  In recent years wage data have collected each quarter for about 850.000 employees in 850-900 firms.
of the regional location or the industry affiliation of the firms for managerial pay differentials?
We make use of data on Czech managers in 1998 and estimate standard earnings equations
augmented with a host of explanatory variables related to firm and job characteristics. The paper
differs from most previous studies of wage determination in transition economies, not only by its
focus on managerial employees, but also by its focus on the period following the initial phase of
marketization. 
The next section presents the data set used and gives a brief description of managerial pay and
managerial pay differentials in the Czech Republic. The third section contains the econometric
analyses of the determinants of managerial compensation. The paper finishes off with some
concluding remarks and suggestions for further research.
2. Data Description
The data set used in this paper is constructed by combining information from three separate
sources. The main part of the data set is an unbalanced panel containing information about 7,764
managerial employees in  229 Czech firms for the year 1998. These data have been collected by
Trexima Zlin, a Czech private consulting company specialised in human resource management.
One of Trexima’s major activities is the development and maintenance of the Average Earnings
Information System (AEIS) in cooperation with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the
Czech Statistical Office.
The AEIS provides detailed information about the labour costs in occupations and at the regional
and industry levels. Thus, AEIS contains information about wages in 400 different occupations
including managerial jobs.2 Part of the information regarding the managers in our data set has been
obtained from the AEIS.
The second source of information is based on the Survey of Managerial Staff Earnings (SMSE)
which is also by carried out by Trexima Zlin. This annual voluntary survey is directed at top
executives, managers and board members and has been carried out since 1993.
The third source of data is a firm register, Obchodni vestnik, which contains information about
firm characteristics. Such information is not collected for the AEIS and Trexima Zlin used the
identification number of organisations (ICO) to supplement the AEIS with information about the
firms. The data set used in this paper has been constructed by merging the three different and
partly overlapping data sets described above. As a consequence it has complete information (that
is, in addition to the SMSE information also AEIS and firm information for the manager) for 4
only part of the data set. However, as there are no reasons to expect the “full information” data
set to be a non-random sample of all managers in the full data set, we will in the following use
this sample in the econometric analyses.
Tables 1 and 2 give some basic descriptive statistics for the managers and the firms, respectively.
From Table 1 we can see that the great majority (79 per cent) of the managers are males and that
two thirds of the managers have a university education. About one third of the total compensation
of the managerial employees comes in other forms than straight salary. Distinguishing between
managerial levels, we may furthermore note that most of the female managers are lower rank and
that the proportion of female decreases at higher levels in the hierarchy. The share of managers
with an university education increases as we move up the corporate ladder. The share of straight
salary in total compensation is on average a  little over thirty per cent and increases from 30 per
cent for division heads to 40 for the CEOs. As the data come from relatively few (but
predominantly large)companies -- see below – the majority of the managerial employees in the
sample are either organisation/unit directors (25 per cent) or division heads (64 per cent)
TABLE 1
TABLE 2
Table 2 contains some descriptive information on the firms by sectors. It can be seen that the
majority of the firms in our sample are medium-sized or large firms (in the Czech sense, of
course: the average number of employees is 1,384) and that the majority of firms are from the
manufacturing sector. One third of the firms are still state-owned and the foreign-owned firms
make up 5 per cent of the sample. The service sector firms are small and more likely to be private
owned.
3. The Determinants of Managerial Pay
This section focuses on various determinants of managerial pay. By “pay” we refer to total
compensation. This is made up of a straight salary component, an individually determined
premium pay component (which is not related to firm performance),  performance related pay and
compensation for board membership. On average straight salary makes up 73.5 per cent of total
compensation, the bonus share is 23 per cent and premium pay and board membership
compensation account for 2.5 and 1 per cent of total pay, respectively.5
The basic equation to be estimated is:
(1)  ln(pay)i = f6 age, educational level, gender, industry, region, firm size (measured by
sales, number of employees, or value of assets) type of firm (ownership), position
within firm>
in which the level of managerial pay is explained by sets of individual, firm and job
characteristics.
On the basis of estimates of different versions of (1) we attempt to answer questions like: Is there
a firm size effect in Czech firms as have been found for a number of other countries? This is a
particularly interesting question with respect to transition economies as during the communist
system large firms, especially firms with many employees, were associated with more political
power and hence, better possibilities to obtain higher pay. If considerable firm size effects still
are present, this would indicate that the managerial pay structure has been rigid.  
Does the type of firm matter? Are there differences between state-owned and privately owned
companies? Among the latter, is there a difference between domestic and foreign firms? How
much do individual characteristics, firm and industry characteristics, and position “explain” of
the variation in pay across individuals? What does the pay-age-experience relationship look like?
What is the role of education? What do pay differentials between positions (after having
controlled for other determinants of pay) look like? How much more does a general manager earn
than managerial employees at lower levels in the corporate hierarchy?
Another set of questions concern regional and inter-industry pay differentials. How large are they
after controlling individual and other factors? During central planning, the tariff wage scales were
set to encourage workers to move to the “socially important” heavy industries. How much of these
inter-industry differentials remain is an interesting question. Another pay differential of interest
is that between the genders; how much is due to differences in individual characteristics, firm
characteristics, and positions held, and how much is due to unobserved (“unexplained”) factors?
Central planning Czechoslovakia used to have the lowest earnings inequality but the highest
gender inequality among the eastern European countries.
Unfortunately, the data set does not include any conventional corporate performance measure.
There is, however, some surrogate information, namely the top manager’s subjective assessment
of the current state of the firm. Although, as will be seen below, this is far from an ideal measure,
we will try it out in order to see what impact firm performance has on the level of managerial pay.
Table 3 reports the results from estimations of a managerial pay equation with standard individual
characteristics, capturing human capital differences, and augmented with job level dummies (the
omitted category being division heads which is the lowest rank in the data set) and firm size as
measured by the log number of employees. The job levels available in the data set are: general6
3  There are more large state owned firms and less managers with a university education in the privately owned
firms. Otherwise, the managers’ observable traits do not differ much between privately and state owned firms.
manager or CEO, assistant manager (odborný reditele), organisation/unit director ( reditel
závodu, divize), and division head (vedouci vyssiho útvaru).  
We can observe the familiar concave age-earnings profile, topping at about 50 years of age, and
university education being rewarded by about 13 per cent higher pay, ceteris paribus. These
estimates as well as the effects of job levels turned out to be very robust to changes in
specification. The gender differential is about 16 per cent even after controlling for human capital
and job levels. It should of course be remembered that the big majority of the female managerial
employees in the Czech Republic are in lower rank positions; see Table 1 above. 
TABLE 3
The job level dummies trace out a clear rank-pay relationship. The relative differences between
CEOs and assistant managers, assistant managers and unit directors, and unit directors and
division heads (the omitted category) are roughly of equal size. Exclusion of the job level
dummies does not lead to dramatic changes in the other coefficients, but it does lead to a
considerable decrease in explanatory power.
The data allow us to distinguish between four types of firms according to their biggest owner:
state-owned, private domestic owned, private foreign owned firms and cooperatives. From Table
3 we can notice that the state-owned firms pay their managers about the same compensation as
domestic private-owned firms (the omitted category) do. There is a small but statistically
significant difference,  the compensation in the state companies being 2.0 - 2.5 per cent lower. We
can see that managers of cooperatives earn considerably less than the others. Furthermore, foreign
owned firms pay their managers about 10 per cent higher compensation than domestic privately
owned firms.
It should be noted that the managerial pay differentials remain largely unchanged also after
controlling for regional and industry effects. Thus, the differentials do not reflect foreign owned
firms being located mainly in the Prague area or that state-owned firms are predominantly found
in certain (manufacturing) industries.
We have also estimated the pay equations separately for managerial employees in state owned
and in privately owned firms, respectively.3 These estimations, which are set out in Table 4,
reveal some interesting similarities as well as differences in the compensation of managers in7
4  Flanagan (1998) estimates earnings equations for all types of wage earners. He finds a private sector wage
premium of about 15 per cent, after controlling for human capital and gender.
5  Flanagan (1998) found the return to education to be higher in privatized firms than in state and new private
sector firms.
state and privately owned firms.4 Firstly, it can be noted that our earnings equations explain
roughly as much of the variation in managers pay in the private sector as in the state-owned firms.
TABLE 4
Secondly, the returns to schooling and experience (measured here by age) do not differ much
between private and state owned firms.5 The return to experience is slightly higher in private
firms. This is quite surprising as one might expect recent labour market experience to be more
valuable in private firms. Also the advantage of having a university degree is the same in the state
and private firms. The gender pay differential is negative in both type of firms but is clearly higher
in the private firms. Thirdly, the hierarchical pay structures are equally steep in private and state
firms.
A difference worth noting is the impact of firm size on managers pay: this is significantly negative
in the private sector firms, whereas executive compensation increases in firm size in the state
sector. Also among private owned firms is there a difference of about 9 per cent in managerial
pay between domestic and foreign firms.
Finally, we can note that entering industry and region dummies did not change the other coefficient
estimates much. For the state firm managers being employed in the process, energy and
construction industries is associated with a substantial wage premium. Notably, the machine
industry does not pays its managers a higher pay than other sectors. There are also relatively large
pay differentials between other industries and regions, and they are among the same magnitude
in state and privately owned firms.
One distinguishing feature of he Czech labour market are the relatively large differentials across
regions and industries; see, for example, Burda and Profit’s (1996) analysis of the regional
unemployment differentials in the Czech Republic. As can be seen from Table 3, columns 2,3 and
4, there remain some significant differences in managerial pay even after catering for individual
characteristics and firm size. In particular the differences between industries appear to be
relatively large. The highest managerial pay is found in the trade  and the construction sector
whereas compensation is lowest in agriculture,  machine manufacturing and the hotel and catering
industry.
The differences between regions are smaller. Managers in the capital region can expect to obtain
about 14 per cent more in pay than managers in South Bohemia which is the omitted region in the
estimations. North Moravian executives earn 8 to 9 per cent more and managers in West Bohemia8
6  As was noted in connection with Table 6, the regional and inter-industry differentials in pay were similar in both
state and privately owned firms.
5 per cent more. The fourth column gives the results from including both region and industry as
explanatory variables.6 The estimated regional and industry effects remain largely unchanged .
Consequently, we can conclude that the regional differentials in managerial pay are only to a
small extent due to regional differences in industry structure. 
The  regional and inter-industry pay differentials found would be a smaller problem if they were
only transitory. We cannot provide evidence that they are, but given the low level of labour
mobility this is unlikely to be the case.  Persistent regional and sectoral wage differentials have
been found in many Western European countries and in the US, too. The problem is that little is
known about the reasons for why they arise and persist. Nevertheless, one should be aware of the
fact that differentials of the magnitude found here, may constitute a strong impediment to
reallocation of managerial employees between industries and regions.
As already noted, a drawback of our data set is that there is no direct corporate performance
measure like rate of return on capital or accounting profits in the SMSE survey. There is,
however, one piece of information about the economic conditions of the firm, namely the
assessment of the situation of the firm by its top manager. The CEOs are asked to state which one
of the four alternatives listed in the table best describes the current situation of the firm. In 1998,
54.7  per cent of the managers in the data set were in firms that were expanding and in good shape,
30.6 per cent were in firms they considered to be stable and 14.7 per cent in companies which
were stagnating. The corresponding shares for firms were 61.1, 23.6 and 14.8 per cent,
respectively. When we entered this information in the managerial pay equation we obtained
following results. 
Firstly, good and expanding firms have higher paid managers than the reference category, the firms
in a stable situation. Secondly, managers in the firms, the condition of which is considered as
stagnating, also had a higher compensation than those in the stable firms. This is somewhat
surprising but it should, of course, be noted that these results refer to the level of pay and not to
changes therein. Note, that the same pattern is present also in the estimations where we control for
industry and region.
Finally, we have also estimated the pay equations on a sub-sample of CEOs. The results which
are set out in Table 5 , differ in many respects from those obtained from estimations on the whole
sample of managers. Thus, for example, the age-pay relation is convex, a pattern for which we lack
an explanation, the coefficient to university education is lower for the CEOs, whereas the firm size
effect on their pay is four times as large as for other managerial employees. For the CEOs there
is no difference in their pay between cooperatives, state owned and domestic private owned firms,
whereas the chief executives in foreign firms earn 16-22 per cent more than the others. General9
managers in good and expanding firms receive a clearly higher compensation than their colleagues.
There is no difference in CEO pay between stable and stagnating firms, however. The regional and
industry differentials appear to be much higher for CEOs. This is especially true for the regional
differences, although one should note that there may be rather few observations from some of the
regions (and industries). As differences with respect to firm performance are smaller, these
differences could be a cause for concern.
4. Concluding remarks
We have made use of a fairly rich data set on Czech managers’ pay, their jobs and employers in
order to study managerial pay determination in a transition economy some years after the initial
phase of marketization . Our findings are firstly that there is a positive firm size effect on
managerial earnings, but that this effect due to a positive pay-firm size relation in for the state-
owned companies. CEO pay is, however, strongly affected by firm size. This is interesting since
pre transition, managers were often rewarded on the basis of company size (which was
synonymous to political power). 
Secondly,  we find that the managers in state-owned firms receive approximately the same
compensation as their colleagues in private owned firms. This result survives inclusion of industry
effects and several other controls. Clearly the non-existence of a pay differential does not create
incentives for the managers in state owned firms to push for further privatisation or reforms in a
market-oriented direction. 
Thirdly, a prominent feature of the data are the significant regional and inter-industry differentials
in pay. The differences remain relatively large even after catering for individual and firm
characteristics. The data at our disposal do not allow us to pinpoint the sources of these premia,
but their mere magnitude should be a cause of concern as they may slow down reallocation
processes. Finally, we have isolated a positive, albeit not very strong, relationship between the
subjectively assessed performance of the firms and the pay levels of their managerial staff. It
should be noted that all these results have been obtained from a single cross-section. In future
work we hope to be able to draw on (longitudinal) data for longer time periods during which there
have been changes in the economic environment as well as in the firms (and especially in their
ownership structure).  10
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Table  1: Descriptive statistics for the managers in 1998
Indicators/Category Total % of total CEO's Ass. Manager Org.dir Div.
Head
Age(average years) 47,29 47,20 44,88 46,09
Gender:
Male 6038 211 560 1298 3969
Female 1597 15 58 585 939
Education:
University 4231 66,49 171 458 1184 2418
Other 2132 33,51 26 87 422 1597
Total compensation (ths) 402,43 1065,84 651,93 448,57 323,59
Salary (ths) 265,60 622,07 396,61 282,70 226,55
Bonus+other comp. (ths) 136,84 443,77 255,33 165,87 97,05
No. of observation 7764 229 620 1909 5006
Table 2:Descripitive statistics for the firms in 1998
Indicator                                % of total  Manufacturing Trade and transports Services
Employees % of observations in industry
up to 99 empl. 8,03 15,86 5,17 78,97
from 100 to 199 empl. 3,59 58,96 5,18 35,86
from 200 to 499 empl. 11,65 71,87 3,69 24,45
from 500 to 999 empl.  15,38 85,77 2,98 11,26
1000 empl. and more 61,36 6,84 7,83 23,78
Ownership % of observations in industry
State  33,31 55,76 7,92 36,32
cooperative 2,80 83,58 8,96 7,46
Private-domest.owned 59,91 68,33 9,18 22,50
Private-foreign owned 3,98 85,61 5,61 8,77
No. of observations 7167 4677 617 1873
Per cent 100 65,26 8,61 26,1312
Table 3. Estimations of managerial pay equations on the 1998 sample
Indep. vars. 1 2 3 4
Constant 4.555**
(0.098)
4.505**
(0.099)
4.564**
(0.096)
4.513**
(0.097)
Age 0.030**
(0.004)
0.031**
(0.004)
0.031**
(0.005)
0.032**
(0.004)
Age2/100 -0.030**
(0.005)
-0.032**
(0.005)
-0.031**
(0.005)
-0.033**
(0.005)
Male 0.160**
(0.010)
0.154**
(0.010)
0.186**
(0.010)
0.175**
(0.010)
University
education
0.128**
(0.009)
0.123**
(0.009)
0.124**
(0.009)
0.121**
(0.009)
CEO 1.097**
(0.023)
1.091**
(0.023)
1.086**
(0.023)
1.083**
(0.023)
Assistant manager 0.669**
(0.015)
0.666**
(0.015)
0.668**
(0.014)
0.666**
(0.014)
Organis. director 0.326**
(0.010)
0.333**
(0.010)
0.302**
(0.010)
0.313**
(0.010)
Log employees 0.022**
(0.002)
0.017**
(0.002)
0.022**
(0.002)
0.017**
(0.002)
State-owned -0.021*
(0.009)
-0.024**
(0.009)
-0.021*
(0.009)
-0.023**
(0.009)
Cooperative -0.204**
(0.024)
-0.201**
(0.025)
-0.156**
(0.024)
-0.155**
(0.024)
Private, foreign
owned
0.134**
(0.018)
0.152**
(0.018)
0.090**
(0.018)
0.099**
(0.019)
Stagnating 0.069**
(0.013)
0.061**
(0.013)
0.114**
(0.014)
0.100**
(0.014)
Good 0.112**
(0.010)
0.120**
(0.010)
0.111**
(0.011)
0.114**
(0.011)
Strong 1.070**
(0.331)
1.015**
(0.327)
1.025**
(0.323)
0.977**
(0.320)
Prague 0.141**
(0.022)
0.136**
(0.022)
North Bohemia 0.042
(0.23)
0.029
(0.023)
Central Bohemia -0.044
(0.031)
-0.057
(0.031)
West Bohemia 0056* 
(0.026)
0.044
(0.026)
Indep. vars. 1 2 3 413
South Moravia 0.021
(0.023)
0.027
(0.022)
North Moravia 0.092**
(0.022)
 0.080**
(0.021)
Agriculture -0.182**
(0.044)
-0.181**
(0.044)
Process industry -0.042**
(0.013)
-0.017
(0.013)
Machines -0.174**
(0.014)
-0.159**
(0.014)
Energy 0.015
(0.019)
0.013
(0.019)
Construction 0.177**
(0.023)
 0.167**
(0.023)
Transports -0.052**
(0.020)
-0.073**
(0.020)
Hotels &
restaurants
-0.159*
(0.073)
-0.170*
(0.072)
R2 0.455 0.469 0.483 0.494
N. of obs. 7,383 7,383 7,383 7,38314
Table 4. Pay equations for managers in state- and private owned firms
Indep. variables Private owned firms State-owned firms
Constant  4.857
(0.118)
 4.517
(0.179)
Age   0.037
(0.005)
 0.032
(0.008)
Age squarred/100 -0.038
(0.006)
-0.031
(0.009)
University education  0.130
(0.011)
 0.132
(0.015)
Female -0.201
(0.013)
-0.108
(0.015)
CEO  1.065
(0.028)
 1.134
(0.040)
Assistant manager  0.698
(0.018)
 0.573
(0.023)
Organisation director  0.345
(0.013)
 0.289
(0.017)
Log employees -0.012
(0.004)
 0.029
(0.005)
Foreign owned  0.091
(0.020)
Regional dummies yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes
R2 0.490 0.532
N. of obs. 5,058 2,13315
Table 5. Pay equations for CEOs only
Indep. variables 1 2 3
Constant  8.784
(1.008)
 8.131
(0.980)
 8.797
(1.009)
Age -0.108
(0.046)
-0.106
(0.044)
-0.110
(0.046)
Age squarred/100 0.113
(0.050)
 0.111
(0.048)
0.117
(0.050)
Male -0.099
(0.107)
-0.086
(0.102)
-0.068
(0.108)
University education  0.088
(0.104)
 0.071
(0.100)
0.078
(0.104)
Log employees  0.081
(0.024)
 0.079
(0.022)
 0.082
(0.024)
State owned -0.009
(0.073)
-0.004
(0.070)
-0.018
(0.075)
Cooperative -0.154
(0.167)
-0.009
(0.166)
-0.092
(0.171)
Foreign private  0.212
(0.133)
 0.158
(0.128)
 0.218
(0.133)
Stagnating -0.042
(0.097)
 0.033
(0.094)
-0.016
(0.100)
Good  0.170
(0.075)
 0.226
(0.073)
 0.199
(0.080)
Prague  0.640
(0.161)
North Bohemia  0.391
(0.173)
Central Bohemia  0.923
(0.252)
West Bohemia  0.312
(0.210)
East Bohemia  0.494
(0.171)
South Moravia  0.704
(0.168)
North Moravia  0.539
(0.160)
Agriculture -0.335
(0.163)16
Indep. variables 1 2 3
Process industry -0.134
(0.080)
Machines -0.092
(0.092)
Energy  0.063
(0.147)
Construction -0.073
(0.166)
Hotels & restaurants 0.363
(0.435)
Transports 0.098
(0.143)
R2 0.105 0.198 0.191
N. of obs. 215 215 215